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Defense Secretary Aspin has decided to 
restructure the policy-making apparatus of 
the Pentagon to direct more attention to 
new national security concerns such as 
human rights and to give the department a 
forceful voice on these issues.! 
I. Introduction 
The close of the Cold W~. caU..¢..!n!~ ~te.s_ ~!fategy to 
change from containment to engagement.2 The National 
Command Authority already has cited the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union as cause f()r tile U:Qit¢ ..~tes .I1i~i~ to expand 
its traditional role of fighting wars, to new nontraditional roles 
promoting human rights and the rule of law throughout the 
world.3 Conceptually, the policy of engagement include 
activities that promote democratic values, free enterprise, and 
peaceful behavior between nations. 
The new nontraditional military missions associated with 
engagement. include peacekeeping operations, humanitarian 
interventions, disaster relief missions, counter-drug activities, 
and nation-building activities; The United States Armed 
Forces enter the post-Cold War era understanding that foster-
ing democracies and encouraging military establishments 
subject to the rule of law are vital to United States national 
security interests. 
The Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) demonstrates 
its commitment to the policy of engagement by providing 
operational legal advice and support to United States military 
forces deployed on these new nontraditional missions.4 Addi-
tionally, Army judge advocates alSQ have provided direct legal 
assistance to die militaries o.f several emerging and struggling 
democracies. Recognizing that law is perhaps the most criti-
cal component of a military organization in a democratic state, 
the JAGC energetically is encouraging the spread of the 
Clinton Administration's emphasis on the promotion of 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.s 
A number of annies and defense ministries have turned to 
the JAGC to assist them in defming how the law can function 
properly in their military establishments, and further, how the 
military itself should fit into a more democratic form of 
government intent on promoting human rights. The JAGC is 
answering specific calls for assistance, serving as a forward-
based resource capable of advising and responding to a variety 
of problems confronting many emerging and struggling 
democracies. This support ranges from supplying basic 
information on how the United State!; mj.li~ adheres to the 
rule of law, to actually assisting host.nition legal officers 
structure their own legal systems. 
In assessing these calls for help, however, the primary con-
cern for United States judge advocates rests with how, over 
the long term, the host nation's military can be encouraged to 
accept a reduced and more professional role appropriate to a 
democracy. Unfortunately, many of the militaries of non-
democratic nations have been the chief abusers of human 
rights. To achieve this long-term goal successfully, two 
overall themes must be directed toward the host military and 
appropriate government officials:6 
(1) foster greater respect for, and an under-
standing of, the principle of civilian control 
of the military; and 
1 Jeffrey Smith, Defense Policy Post Restructured, WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 1993, at Al. 
2See generally DEP'ToPARMY, TODAY's CHAll.ENGE: TOMORROW's ARMY IT (Jan. 1993). 
3Smith, supra note 1, at A4. 
4See David E. Graham, Operational Law (OPLAWH Concept Comes of Age, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 9; Operational Law Note, Proceedings of the First 
Center for Law and Military Operations Symposium, ARMY LAw., Dec. 1990, at 47. To support evolving missions associated with operational deployments better, 
the Judge Advocate General's Corps developed a new legal discipline in the late 1980s. Termed "operational law," a working definition is "[t]hat body of 
domestic, foreign, and international law that impacts specifically upon the military operations of U.S. forces in combat and peacetime engagements." INr'L. L 
DN., 1HE JUDGE ADvoCATE GENERAL's SrnooL, U.S. ARMY, JA-422 A17 (May 1992). 
STo understand the importance of law to a military organization in a democratic society, see RICHARD SIMPKIN, RACE TO THE SWIFT 320 (1985). Simpkin's book is 
about warfare in the 21st century, and he concludes that democracies must find "politico-legal devices" to confront the enemies that threaten today' s society. 
Simpkin states, "Democratic governments rest on the rule of law, and must so rest," and therefore, military actions must conform with the law. !d. 
6See The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2347 (West Supp. 1992) (providing the authority for security assistance under the International 
Military Education and Training (!MEn Program). These two goals are taken from the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1991, tiL IT, Pub. L. No. 101-513,104 Stat.§ 1997 (1991). 
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(2) improve military justice systems and 
procedures to comport with internationally··· 
recognized standards of human rights. 
Recognizing that the militaries in many emerging and 
struggling democracies have a slim frame of reference for 
properly handling human rights issues, a major focus of the 
Army J AGC is to promote, strengthen, and assist the host 
nation's armed forces in institutionalizing human rights 
training. This concern for human rights mirrors the overall 
United States national security policy of peacetime engage-
ment by maintaining contacts with allies and friendly govern-
ments to impart values and ideals associated with democratic 
principles. 7 
Requests for help are arriving from countries as diverse as 
the new republics of the former Soviet Union, to the longer 
standing, but troubled, democracies of Central and South 
America. One outstanding example of how Army judge 
advocates have been involved in the promotion ofthese vital 
interests is the current "train the trainer" initiative in Peru. 
II. The Peruvian Human Rights Training Initiative 
A major obstacle in imparting concepts relating to human 
rights and democratic principles is that many of these emerg-
ing and struggling democracies typically are faced with the 
social and economic tUrmoil traditionally associated with low 
intensity conflictS {LIC) environments, ranging from economic 
-.-. chaos to actual armed insurgency. Consequently, the effec-
tiveness of any assistance program must be measured against 
the realities associated with the speCific LIC problems facing 
the host nation. 
Nowhere in the world do the multiple forces of insurgency, 
terrorism, and drug trafficking threaten societal order ·more 
than they do in Peru. In the confirmation hearings of Warren 
Christopher for Secretary of State, Peru was identified as a 
country vitai to United States national security interests and in 
need of United States assistance. Nevertheless, Peru is a 
country bitterly engulfed, and almost overwhelmed, with 
internal threats.9 
Taking office in 1990, during the middle of a major terrorist 
siege on his· country-primarily sponsored by the Sendero 
Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac 
AmaruiO_peruvian President Fujimori sought ways to gain 
and maintain legitimacy for his imperiled government. 
Working through the United States ambassador, Fujimori 
sought human rights training for various components of his 
government. Although initial contacts were made, the politi-
cal and terrorist situation prevented any training from taking 
place. Actually, by April 1992, the terrorist offensive had 
gained such momentum that some analysts were predicting 
the fall of the government. 
Fear and corruption were so great that Fujimori executed an 
"autocoup" by which he suspended the Constitution, disbanded 
Congress and most of the judiciary, and began extensive use 
of the military and the military courts to regain control of the 
country. Although the autocoup-with the subsequent arrest 
of Abimael Guzman, the founder arid leader of the Sendero 
Luminoso---;-actually resulted in bettering the conditions in 
Peru, the international community's response toPiesident 
Fujimori's actions was one of general disappointment. The 
United States Congress stopped viitually all financial and 
technical assistance untifilie politiclll situation settled and a 
new Congress was·seated in·free elections.tt 
.On the home front,PresidentFujimori maintained the popu-
lar, though not unanimous, support of the Peruvian people. 
Because the terrorists targeted the general population, most 
Peruvians accepted any reasonable government action to halt 
7This concern exceeds rhe ririnimally accepted stimdaids for human righis.estahlisliea' by custOmary mternali.on8I law. Inteinatioo;u law prohibits genocide: 
slavery, murder or "disappearance"; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treabJ1tmt ot pui'li.shment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial 
discrimination, or any activity that demonstrates a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rightS. The Unite~ Suites traditionally 
has promoted by treaty, declaration, and action the fullest possible ~ge of meaningful human :nihiS·: These-ngtlts ilicltide free~om ofieligioii, "fre;;'dorn of" 
association, freedom of speech, and all of rhose principles indicaiive of a truly deriiocratic' sodeey:·'-Siie, ·~:r.· THOMAS Bi~.· INTERNATIONAL HUMAN. 
Rloms (1988). · · · 
BSee DEP'TS OF ARMY & AIR FORCE, FIElD MANUAL HXJ-20, MILITARY ~I IN Low ~IY Coi.'I~'(Dec.l989). h~ term ulow intensity conflict" is 
defmed as follows: 
/d. 
Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above rhe routine, peacefUl competition · 
among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from 
subversion to r.he use of armed forces. It is waged· by ii ooinbmauOI! of means, employmg poliiicarecooOriiic, mtematiorial, and miliiary 
instruments. 
9Coverage of Senate Confirmation Hearings (C-SPAN tclevision broadcast, fim. 18, 199'3). 
10See, e.g., Mary Speck, Caught in Peru's Crossfire, MIAMI HERALD (Int'l Edition), Dec. 8, 1992, at Al. 
' 11 The government of Peru lias had t0 make some extremely difficult deCiSions io receive t:J'rute(fStaies'a'fd:··til(e'an·Coiiiliries)'eruis"a recipi.e~tof UDited sial~ ' 
assistance Wider rhe provisions of The Fereign Assistarice Al:t of 1961, PUb. L No. 1 S7 -195 (cOdified as'2'i U :s.t. nYsf (1988)). 'nils act, however, proliihiu 
United States security assistance to COWltries rhat "engage in a consistent panem of gross violations of ·ifir:em-ati.Onally recogruzed human rights~" See 22 u.s.c. § 
2304 (a)(2-3)(1988). 
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the killings.12 President Fujimori had to find the proper 
balance between maintaining contrQI, and not allowing his 
government forces to cross the line of excessive behavio~. -
Strong, swift retribution by government officials, whose 
families often had been the target of attack, was an under-
standable reaction, but one that caused extensive debate both 
in Peru and in the international community. While .the gov-
ernment' of Peru intensified a. Series qf cqncrete initiatives_ to 
combat the terrorist threat, the Peruvian military acknowl-
edged that the natural temptation for the soldiers to respond in 
kind to terrorist brutality had to be halted. The behavior not 
only was counterproductive to maintaining the full support of 
the people, but also the internatipnal image of the Peruvian 
military suffered. Foremost in Peru's fight for survival was 
maintaining the legitimacy of the Peruvian government, 
wherein true democracy would have a chance to endure. A. 
major step in remedying the legitimacy issue was tOjnculcate 
human rights and law of armed conflict training into its auned 
forces. 
As the situation in Peru stabili;Zed, the Peruvian . military 
sought United States military assistance in a human rights 
initiative for its anped forces. Working through the military 
assistance and advisory group in Lima, Peru, the Commander 
in Chief, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) 
offered to provide assistance out of his initiative funds.13 In 
tum, the SOUTIICOM Staff Judge Advocate asked the Inter-
national and Operational Law. Division, Office of The Judge 
Advocate General (OTJAG), if it could conduct a human rights 
training mission in Peru. Ultimately, the International and 
Operational Law Division joined with the International Law 
Division at The Judge Advocate General's School (TJAGSA) 
to develop and execute a human rights plan consisting of five 
phases. 
A. Phase I: Developing a Concept Plan 
The first phase of the concept plan called for a site survey 
in Peru. In August of 1992, two United States Army judge 
advocates traveled to Lima, Peru, to discuss the overall human 
rights situation with their Peruvian counterparts. While the 
Peruvians expressed a desire to receive human rights instruc-
tion, little, if any, standardized methOdology existed to teach 
human rights to its soldiers. .N9 .military legal facility 
designed and equipped to train Peruvian judge advocates and 
commanders in these specialized legal areas existed. In 
addition, the investigative process for soldiers accused of 
human rights abuses apparently was deficient. 
" .,., ',-:-' .• ' . ~· .. , .,.., 
Clearly, Peruvian soldiers in the.f~ddhad, t~')~e given 
meaningful human rights training if they were expected to 
cope better with the abuses of terrorists, and if they were to be 
held accountable when violations occurred. Furthermore, this 
training had to be institutionalized into the Peruvian military 
system so that human rights training would be a continuous 
requirement for all soldiers. The normal route,pf sending a 
United States mobile training team to Latin America-which 
usually involved a "()ne .. sllot" course on a particular topic-
would be. inadequate to institutionalize the lesson~ necessary 
to achieve minimal international human rights standards. 
Cultural, ~g~ge, and ~i~ l>IDie~ suggested that the best 
chaJ!Ce for sucsess would be for Peruvian instructors to 
deliver the actual subject matter presentations. 
After extensive meetings with representatives from ~ch of 
the Peruvian services, including The Judge Advocate General 
of the Peruvian Army, a joint concept plan was formulated. 
This plan was designed to teach Peruvian judge advocates 
"how to teach" human rights and then to assis~ those same 
individuals i~ 9eyeloping lesson plans that they could use to 
preSent hUIJl!Ul :rights class~ throughout the Peruvian military. 
In this manner, human rights training would be taught by 
Peruvian.insJructors and institutionalized.Jn!o the, Pel}lvian 
military. Simply put, the theme would be to "tr~!n the 
trainers." 
B. Phase II: Training at TJAGSA. 
Six Peruvian military judge advocates-two each from the 
Peruvian Anny, Navy, and Air Force-traveled to TJAGSA, 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, for a two-week period in October 
and November of 1992 .. D!,lring these two weeks, the Peruvian 
judge advocates entered into an extensive working relation-
ship with judge advocates from .the U~ited States AriJ:ly, Air 
Force, and ~avy. The purpose of this wqrking relationship 
was t~ofold. First. the. Peruvians were assis~d in. developing 
a comprehensive human rights tfaining program of instruction 
that would be used to present a week-long human rights 
course for a broad based Peruvian audience. A Spanish lan-
guage deskbookwas developed. covering topics such as human 
rights, law of armed conflict. international law, and criminal 
investigations, and which contained key documents in these 
areas. The second purpose was to train the Peruvians h()w l9. 
teach these classes effectively. These officers would form the 
nuc~eus of a permanent pool of Peruvian instructors ~h tl;le,n 
would teach human rights throughout their armed forces. 
· C. Phase 1/I: Teaching the First Peruviqn Clas$_ 
The third phase of the plan took place from 15 through 19 
December 1992. The Peruvian instructors used the human 
rights deskbook developed at TJAGSA during Phase II to 
provide a four-day human rights training course in Lima, 
Peru: The course was taught by the same Peruvian judge 
·1 \ ,.I" J ' '·•' "' ' . -"'.d ~> ~. .,, • ,._ . ',_.. , ... '- ~\. ' ~- ' - . actvoca.t~s wbqatte,nc;l~d l'h~ II in Chct:lo~tesville, Virginia, 
assisted by two United States Army judge advocates and one 
Air Force judge advocate. Approximately flfty participants, 
consist~ng of field commanders and their judge advocates, 
12In. their efforts to .C()!;rce the populace into ~ubmission, the terrorists regularly bombed crowded places, destroyed power plants and public utilities. and, publicly 
execu).ed govellUllent officials. he:endero~:s ca}ling card is torture and mutilation o(viCtiffis, accomparued with ihe slaughtering of dogs that are booby trapped 
and then hung on laffip posts throughout the ~ocal conmpmity. 
1310 U.S.C. § 166(a) (1988). 
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attended this course.I4 The goal of this training course was 
not only to provide human rights instruction to senior military 
commanders, but also to provide the Peruvian judge advocates 
their "baptism under ftre" in presenting these materials to an 
audience of their peers. 
Five Peruvian instructors led the course, which consisted of 
platform instruction and seminars. They presented the material 
and handled the logistics of the conference in an exceptional 
manner. The Peruvian instructors quickly took charge of the 
various· seminars, divided the participants into five "joint" 
groups, and then led individual group discussions. Pha$e III 
was a complete success. The Peruvian instrm;tors clearly 
demonstrated that they were fully capable and desirous of 
conducting subsequent human rights training. 
< - "''" f -~ ' ' _.,.:;:~.-. ''"'" ,f,_~ 
All of the attendees actively participated in the course and 
seminars, engaged in the question and answer sessions, and, 
most notably. carried on anima~ discussions folfo,;;;D.g" me 
daily classes. The reporting and investigating requirementS-of 
alleged human rights abuses sparked particular interest. The 
overwhelming acceptance of the material presented by the 
instructors strongly indicated the Peruvians' genuine interest 
in human rights issues. 
D. Phase IV: Tailoring the Human Rights Courses ..... . 
Prompted by the success of the Phase III training course, 
the Peruvians wanted to develop separate one-day course 
outlines for presentation to three distinct groups in the 
Peruvian military-junior enlisted soldiers, noncommlssiori'ed . 
and junior officers, and judge advocates. Accordingly, several 
Peruvian judge advocates spent the next two months design-
ing this project. The extensive course deskbook used during 
Phase III served as the catalyst for developing a standardized 
set of materials tailored for each of the three target groups. In 
addition, this deskbook was sent to each of the military acade-
mies and service schools in Peru as a guide for revamping 
training at those institutions. 
In February of 1993, two Peruvian judge advocates returned 
to TJAGSA and, relying on their work products and assistance 
from United States judge advocates, produced.severat p;o-
grams of instruction-one for each of the target audiences. 
The course and pamphlet directed at the junior enlisted soldiers 
is noteworthy; because many enlisted soldiers in the Peruvian 
Army are not able to read, the pamphlet and instruction rely 
heavily on visual aids. This pamphlet entitled "The Teri Com-
mandments of Human Rights," lays down easy to understand 
rules and guidelines for those soldiers m.ost likely to encqunter 
situations when human rights violations occur. The vis_ual 
aids capture the essence of the main teaching points, and the 
back cover of the pamphlet contains a tear away card to be 
used as a"human rightsROE card." · · · · 
The programs of instruction for the junior enlisted soldiers 
and officers contain common characteristics. The instruction 
stresses adherence to the rule of law. Civilian control of the 
military, and the military's role in a democratic society are 
central themes to the. insl11Jction. The development of human 
rights and the relation of human rights concerns with the law 
of war are discussed thoroughly. Finally, the "bottom line" is 
explained-that is, the rights and responsibilities of individ-
uals in a democratic society; the duties of soldiers, com-
manders, police and other government officials in relation to 
human rights; and the international, regional; and domestic 
minimally accepted human rights standards. 
, . • i ~· ' ,..,-'" l ' 
These three instruction programs· give· Peru the tools to 
institutionalize human rights training into the very fabric of its 
anned forces. What remains, is to implement the programs at 
the troop leve[ 
E.- Phase V: Human Rights Training in the Field 
The final phase of the concept plan will take place in the 
Spring of 1993. Two United States Army judge advocates 
will accompany the Peruvian instructors as the instructors 
deliver one-day courses throughout Peru. This phase will 
culminate the plan, after which the Peruvian judge advocates 
will assume the full duties of delivering, improving, and 
continuing the human rights program. 
~e. apparent success of the pnited Slfltes efforts in Peru 
must be tempered with the realization that human rights 
training can be effective only to the degree that it is inculcated 
into the psyche of the Peruvian military .. At a minimum, the 
Peruv1ari.s .. must now have 'i.hree standardized human rights 
training programs of instruction that are truly their own. The 
Peruvians now must continue the effort. The strategy to keep 
the United States' role as that of a "helper," and not as an 
overseer, has paid tremendous dividends. If the Peruvian 
military is successful, the success will be attributable to its 
commitment in continuing to teach human rights. Teaching 
and training must go hand-in-hand with investigating abuses 
and holding the responsible parties accountable. 
III. Conclusion 
The Peruvian human rights initiative is a model for the 
future: While the 'tfactiti6nafc()ncepi of mifiiMy might is 
ab()~Ui¢ly necesSary to ensUre the protection Of ideals related 
to human rights and the rule of law, the UriJ,ted States' 'strongest 
asset always h'as oeen the eX'port of those' ideals tO the-rest of 
the world. In the posi~Col(fWar er~Cwfiatoeiter' use" or o~ 
·iniH~y resou:rce(exists--than promoting respect for h~rnan 
rights by uniformed soldiers, tfalned in the law, who de;t;on-
strate that a stfpng militafy can operate under civilian control? 
While one never may 'know ,_h~~-m~y lives are sa~ed by 
the ~fforts of theUniteQ States Army JAGC, the tremendo~s 
potential for good certainly exceeds the minimal costs. U~ited 
Slfltes Army lawyers already are edlJ.<;ated and trained in these 
14 All three anned services were represented, as well as senior police officials, representatives from the Attorney General's office, the Director of Human Rights, 
and many line officers assigned to the ~emergency zones." ·~- ·: ·; c: . ·.· .. ·< i. 
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areas, judge advocates are deployed forward throughout the 
world, and by engaging receptive host nations with these 
concepts, their efforts will accrue synergistic effects .that bene-
fit other vital interests. Undoubtedly, alliances and personal 
contacts will be developed, democratic ideals and the rule of 
law will be promoted, and the subordination of the military to 
civilian control will be advanced. 
The concept of training the trainyr places the c:pst Wtd the 
reward where it belongs-on the host country. If the initiative 
is successful, it is because the host nation takes the program 
on as its own and gives it sufficient resources to ~oqtinu~. If 
it fails, the United ta~s shqyl!:l. not lx,(_ fau~e<l for trying.ts 
The Peru initiative should~ emulatedforits s!mplicity, its 
focus, and its potential for impact throughout the world. 
The post-Cold War era shines with a renewed hope for last-
ing peace and commitment to human rights; the central theme 
resting in the promise of a new world order based on. ~e rule 
of law. One of those rare moments in history now exists when 
a window of opportunity has opened for the world to make 
substantial and lasting strides towards controlling aggressive 
warfare and significantly improving the condition of humanicy. 
The defense ministries of ~ountries seeking assistance in 
creating a law-based military establishment look to the United 
States fortwo reasons. First, t~e United States military 
emerged from the Cold War as the foremost power in the 
world-a power that possesses the capability to influence 
change. Second, countries recognize that the United States 
Armed Forces have functioned superbly under a rule of law-
whether in the realm of respecting the law of armed conflict16 
or in providing a workable and fair system of law for soldiers. 
In the larger picture, the end of the largest totalitarian 
system the world has ever known-the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact-offers a unique opportunity for mankind to 
advance the rule of law and respect for human rights. The 
world now looks to the United States to provide moral and 
political leadership, and the United States is stepping up to 
meet the challenge. As a pan of that movement forward, we 
are using United States military attorneys as vehicles to 
achieve goals and pr'6grams that are fundamental to our national 
security-promotion of the rule of law and human rights 
throughout the world~-, '·'""''~" ., ,., · 
1surr you give a man a fish you feed him for a day; if you teach a man how to fish, you feed him for a lifetime." The United States cannot give fish, or human 
rights instruction, on a continued basis to every country in the world. The United Stales, however, can engage countries on a case-by-case basis for short periods of 
time, and share. with them materials tllat /:Jave proven beneficial in the teaching of human rights, civilian control of !he mi]itary, and th~ rule oflaw, . 
l6See DIETRJCH ScHINDLER & IIAI ToMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLICI' (1988). The law of armed conflict is.drawil from several sources including international 
agreement, custom and practice, judicial decision, and general prin~iples or law. < . • . .. . .... . .. ·:· :::· 
CLENEWS 
1. Resident Course Quotas 
Attendance at resident {Continuing Legal Education) CLE 
courses at _The Judge Advocate General's S.cllpol (TJAGSA) 
is restricted to those who have. been allocated_ student quotas. 
Quotas for TJAGSA q.~ ':!()~e~-are I1~~ged thtough the 
Army Training Requirements and Resources System 
(ATRRS), the Armywide automated quota management 
system. The ATRRS school code for TJAGSA is 181. ·If you 
do not hav~ a co~rll'med quota in ATRRS, yoll.do not have 
a quota for a TJAGSA CLE course. Active duty service 
members must obtain quotas through their directorates of 
training or through equivalent agencies. Reservists must 
obtain quotas through their unit training offices or, if they are 
nonunit reservists, through ARPERCEN, ATTN: DARP-
OPS-JA, 9700 Page Boulevard, St Louis, MO 63132-5200. 
Army National Guard personnel should request quotas 
through their unit training offices. To verify a quota, ask your 
training office to provide you with a screen print of th¥ 
ATRRS Rl screen showing by-riame reservations. 
2. TJAGSA CLE Course Sch_edule 
1993 
5-9 April: 4th Law for Legal NCO's (512-71D/E!20/30). 
12-16 April: I 17th Senior Officer Legal Orientation Course 
(SF-Fl). 
12-16 April: 15th Operation& Law Seminar (SF-F47). 
20-23 April: TJAG's Reserve Component Annual CLE 
Workshop (5F-F56). 
26 April-7 May: 131st Contract Attorneys Course (SF- r 
FlO). 
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